• BigLamed
• Pantheon of Thought, Symbols of Humanity

This post is also available in:

The Nature of Power or Myths of World Order

Methodological annotation: This analytical review is devoted to the study of the ontology of power relations and a critical analysis of the structural models that determine the dynamics of contemporary geopolitical and social processes.

Below is a transcript of Andriy Baumeister’s lecture, supplemented with a summary of key questions. The video recording of the lecture is available here:
Watch the video: The Nature of Power or Myths of World Order

Transcript of the lecture Andrey Baumeister

• — What is power? How to define the nature of power? Why is power difficult to define?
• The turning point: September 1870. Italian troops capture Rome.
• Today, we are witnessing a devaluation of the idea of power and a transformation in the nature of power.
• — How does the changing nature of power affect the transformation of the world order?
• — What role will nations play in the new world order?
• Transcript of Andriy Baumeister’s Lecture
  • Introduction: A World of Rapid Change
  • The Difficulty of Defining Power
  • The Historical Formation of the Concept of Power
  • The Symbolic Turning Point: September 1870
  • The Two Superpowers and the World Order after 1945
  • After 1991: The Debate on the Future World Order
  • Nations in the Future: Strong vs. Weak Nationalism (Fukuyama)
  • The Three Pillars of “Strong Nationalism” and Their Decline
  • Ukraine at a Crossroads: Soft or Hard Identity?
  • Conclusion: The Nature of Power and Symbolic Systems

— What is power? How to define the nature of power? Why is power difficult to define?

The concept of power only began to take shape during the Middle Ages, in the interaction between the Pope and the Emperor, between the sacred and the secular.

The turning point: September 1870. Italian troops capture Rome.

By the beginning of the 20th century, power came to be understood in increasingly functional terms (Max Weber) as the ability to realize one’s own will despite the resistance of other actors.

Today, we are witnessing a devaluation of the idea of power and a transformation in the nature of power.

— How does the changing nature of power affect the transformation of the world order?

An example of opposing positions: Robert Kagan vs. Parag Khanna. A world order governed by a dominant force (the US) versus the distribution of power according to a network principle (a new Middle Ages).

— What role will nations play in the new world order?

An analysis of Fukuyama’s article A Country of Their Own. Liberalism Needs the Nation.

The nation in a strong sense and in a weak sense. The nation as a product of mythology versus the political nation.

My examples. Why the nation in the strong sense has no future.

Transcript of Andriy Baumeister’s Lecture

Introduction: A World of Rapid Change

We are witnessing very rapid changes. The causes of these changes have been maturing for a very long time — several decades, probably since the 1990s, perhaps since the late 1980s. Today, some with horror, some with surprise, some with bated breath, we observe rapid shifts in all directions. There is talk of a radical restructuring of the world order, of new, rapid trends: the emergence of new values in conflict with traditional ones, changes in the economic order, the United States losing its hegemony, the restructuring of many global connections.

These issues were debated before the war in Ukraine, but during the pandemic, and especially now, the changes have become fully observable. Experts, analysts, philosophers, historians, and political scientists are trying, amid this rapid pace of change, to discern the signs of the future.

The Difficulty of Defining Power

The first important point: the change in our understanding of power. We talk about hegemony, about great powers, about world orders, but the question of the nature of power arises — not only of institutions, but of state power and great powers.

If we open a dictionary of political science and look up the entry “Power,” we will be surprised to find that the concept of power in political science is very difficult to define. Finding a definition is hard. This is important because many people demand a clear definition; otherwise, “there is no point in talking about it.”

It is also important to understand that the concept of power does not emerge all at once; it develops over historical time.

The Historical Formation of the Concept of Power

Antiquity and the Middle Ages

For the Greeks and Romans, up to the imperial period, the concept of power had not yet been developed as an abstract, universal concept separate from individuals and institutions. The succession of power in the Roman Empire was not codified, and the spheres of competence of the emperor or the senate were not clearly delineated. Augustus held the title “princeps” — first among citizens.

The concept of power in the sense we use it today began to crystallize in the Middle Ages, as Western Europe was taking shape. Power was inextricably linked to the religious dimension, to divine sanction. The interaction between the Pope and the Emperor, and later kings, shaped the understanding that power is determined not only by military force but also by legitimation through a transcendent principle. Until the end of the 19th century, every power in Europe understood itself as a representation of something beyond the human, beyond mere force. Violence went against divine ordinances; wars were fought in the name of these principles.

Modernity and the Functional Understanding (Max Weber)

Gradually, especially after World War I, the understanding of power became increasingly pragmatic. The classic exponent of this approach is Max Weber. In his work “Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft” (1922), he defines power (Macht) as “the chance within social relations to realize one’s own will despite the resistance of others.” This is a functional understanding: power is the ability to impose one’s will for a group, institution, or state.

Communicative Theory (Habermas)

On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas attempts to move away from “brute, oppressive power” and justify power through communication, through “the force of the better argument.” However, he has been criticized (e.g., by Spohn) for substituting the power of intellectuals and for an excessive faith in rationality. Nonetheless, this approach highlights the tension between the functional (Weber) and the communicative (Habermas) understanding of power.

Finally, political power is also understood as legitimate violence — the state’s monopoly on violence. This conception emerges after World War I, when religious and dynastic justifications for power were discarded.

The Symbolic Turning Point: September 1870

To understand how religious legitimation of power was undermined, the episode of September 1870 is crucial. In July, the Franco-Prussian War began, and the French garrison guarding the Vatican was withdrawn. King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy sent an envoy to Pope Pius IX proposing to open the gates. The Pope proudly responded: “I am neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet, but I declare that you will never enter Rome.” Yet on September 11, the Italian army crossed the border, and on September 20, after a three‑hour artillery bombardment, entered Rome. The Papal States fell. This symbolic event marked the exhaustion of power based on religious legitimation. Power became increasingly instrumentalized, and religion began to be used for secular purposes.

The Two Superpowers and the World Order after 1945

During the period 1945–1991, the world was structured by the confrontation between two superpowers. On the façade of the Western world led by the US stood freedom, human rights, free trade. On the façade of the socialist bloc stood equality, justice, decolonization. Behind the façades lay strategies of nuclear deterrence and powerful armies.

Between them lay Europe, which played the role of a complex political field, as well as the “Third World” (Africa, Asia, Latin America) — an arena where the two systems clashed. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, a period began that many called the “American century,” but at the same time new players began to emerge: China, Russia, a resurgent India, Brazil, and challenges in the Middle East.

After 1991: The Debate on the Future World Order

Robert Kagan: The Necessity of American Hegemony

In his article “The Price of Hegemony” (Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022), Robert Kagan argues that the United States must under no circumstances cede its spheres of influence to emerging powers (China, Russia). He criticizes the idea of “becoming a normal country” and believes that American hegemony is more necessary than ever for the world. The problem, he says, is that it is difficult to determine the right moment to apply force. But Kagan is certain: America must remain the primary hegemon, and its soft power (prosperity, liberalization of lifestyle) was attractive even to the late USSR.

Parag Khanna: Network Structure and a New Middle Ages

An alternative perspective is offered by the Indian‑American political scientist Parag Khanna in his article “Is an Order Possible?” (Die Zeit). He argues that hegemony is a myth, and that no real world order has ever been based on a single power. He speaks of the dispersion of power, of networking, and calls the emerging order a “new Middle Ages” — a multitude of entities governed by symbolic systems. In the 21st century, the world will resemble medieval Europe on a global scale: not Pax Americana and not Pax Sinica, but a system where military force matters, but symbolic structures play the decisive role.

This raises the question: what can these symbolic systems rely on, if in the Middle Ages it was God? Today, neither God nor the reason of the Enlightenment holds unquestionable authority.

Nations in the Future: Strong vs. Weak Nationalism (Fukuyama)

Francis Fukuyama, in his article “A Country of Their Own: Liberalism Needs the Nation” (also in Foreign Affairs), examines the role of the nation in the new world order. He agrees that the global order should be based on sovereign nations, but distinguishes two types of national identity:

• Strong nationalism (the nation in a strong sense) — based on fixed characteristics (language, ethnicity, a rigid historical mythology). It is dangerous, tending toward aggressive and exclusionary nationalism.
• Weak nationalism (the nation in a weak sense, the political nation) — flexible, inclusive, embracing diversity. Examples: Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia. Such a nation is built on political principles, not rigid ethno‑cultural markers.

Fukuyama calls this “social democracy” or “consociational democracy,” where the political system is oriented toward the interests of minorities and allows the unification of different languages and cultures under universal values.

He concludes: if Russia wins the war, the world will return to the aggressive, intolerant nationalism of the first half of the 20th century. If Ukraine wins, it must build itself precisely as a nation in the weak sense, a political nation. However, realities in Ukraine show that many are inclined toward a strong identity, which mirrors the Kremlin’s politics.

The Three Pillars of “Strong Nationalism” and Their Decline

Strong nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries rested on three main pillars:

• Historical mythology — a romanticized or fabricated heroic past, myths of oppression and liberation.
• Great literature — writers who created national narratives (e.g., in Italy, Germany, Poland). Literature formed the nation even in the absence of a state.
• Language — unification, the creation of a literary standard, often suppressing dialects and minorities.

Today, these three factors are losing their power:

• Literature no longer plays the role it did in the 19th century. There are no great literary movements shaping nations.
• Historical mythology is being attacked by left‑wing, post‑colonial approaches, and global history.
• In strong nationalism, language turns from a creative into a repressive tool. But the purpose of language is to create, enrich, and connect peoples, not to be a line of demarcation.

Thus, strong nationalism is doomed, and attempts to use these old instruments in the 21st century mean regressing to the past.

Ukraine at a Crossroads: Soft or Hard Identity?

This is especially relevant for Ukraine. Those who try to unify the country along linguistic and cultural lines do not understand that they are mirroring the Kremlin’s policy. The fight against Putinism should not be waged with its own methods. Ukraine’s victory should not mean the triumph of hard nationalism; otherwise, we will find ourselves in the same 19th century, only without the divine dimension.

Ukraine needs to move toward a political nation, a soft identity that embraces the diversity of languages, cultures, and narratives. This is the only path that has a future in the 21st century.

Conclusion: The Nature of Power and Symbolic Systems

In the past, power was tied to the sacred, then to functionality and legitimate violence. Today, we face a dilemma: either a return to a hegemonic, coercive order (Kagan) or a transition to a networked, symbolic system (Khanna). To be effective, symbolic systems need authority — whether God, reason, or other universal values. Without such authority, power becomes either purely coercive or fragmented and unstable.

For Ukraine and for the entire world, the choice is whether to follow the path of rigid ethno‑national mobilization (which leads to a dead end) or to build an inclusive political nation capable of becoming the foundation of a stable world order. The answer to this question will determine the nature of power in the coming decades.